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Brandon Fain∗ Kamesh Munagala† Nisarg Shah‡
Abstract
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the pub-
lic goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen,
and assume that agents have additive utilities across elements. Our model generalizes existing
frameworks such as fair public decision making and participatory budgeting. We study a group-
wise fairness notion called the core, which generalizes well-studied notions of proportionality
and Pareto efficiency, and requires that each subset of agents must receive an outcome that is
fair relative to its size.
In contrast to the case of divisible public goods (where fractional allocations are permitted),
the core is not guaranteed to exist when allocating indivisible public goods. Our primary
contributions are the notion of an additive approximation to the core (with a tiny multiplicative
loss), and polynomial time algorithms that achieve a small additive approximation, where the
additive factor is relative to the largest utility of an agent for an element. If the feasibility
constraints define a matroid, we show an additive approximation of 2. A similar approach yields
a constant additive bound when the feasibility constraints define a matching. More generally, if
the feasibility constraints define an arbitrary packing polytope with mild restrictions, we show
an additive guarantee that is logarithmic in the width of the polytope. Our algorithms are based
on variants of the convex program for maximizing the Nash social welfare, but differ significantly
from previous work in how it is used. Our guarantees are meaningful even when there are fewer
elements than the number of agents. As far as we are aware, our work is the first to approximate
the core in indivisible settings.
1 Introduction
In fair resource allocation, most work considers private goods; each good must be assigned to
a particular agent (and no other). However, not all goods are private. Public goods are those
which can be enjoyed by multiple agents simultaneously, like a public road. Allocation of public
goods generalizes the problem of allocation of private goods, and, as we will see, can provide new
difficulties from both a normative and an algorithmic perspective.
Consider an example to highlight what a public resource allocation problem might look like,
and why fairness might be a concern. Suppose that the next time you vote, you see that there are
four referendums for your consideration on the ballot, all of which concern the allocation of various
public goods in your city: A = a new school, B = enlarging the public library, C = renovating the
community college, and D = improving a museum. In 2016, residents of Durham, North Carolina
faced precisely these options [25]. Suppose the government has resources to fund only two of the
four projects, and the (hypothetical) results were as follows: a little more than half of the population
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voted for (A,B), a little less than half voted for (C,D), and every other combination received a
small number of votes. Which projects should be funded?
If we na¨ıvely tally the votes, we would fund A and B, and ignore the preferences of a very
large minority. In contrast, funding A and C seems like a reasonable compromise. Of course, it
is impossible to satisfy all voters, but given a wide enough range of possible outcomes, perhaps
we can find one that fairly reflects the preferences of large subsets of the population. This idea
is not captured by fairness axioms like proportionality or their approximations [10], which view
fairness from the perspectives of individual agents. Indeed, in the aforementioned example, every
allocation gives zero utility to some agent, and would be deemed equally good according to such
fairness criteria.
1.1 Public Goods Model
We consider a fairly broad model for public goods allocation that generalizes much of previous
work [24, 10, 11, 3, 12, 9, 30]. There is a set of voters (or agents) N = [n]. Public goods are
modeled as elements of a ground set W . We denote m = |W |. An outcome c is a subset of W . Let
F ⊆ 2W denote the set of feasible outcomes.
The utility of agent i for element j ∈ W is denoted uij ∈ R≥0. We assume that agents have
additive utilities, i.e., the utility of agent i under outcome c ∈ F is ui(c) =
∑
j∈c uij. Since we are
interested in scale-invariant guarantees, we assume without loss of generality that maxj∈W uij = 1
for each agent i, so that uij ∈ [0, 1] for all i, j. Crucially, this does not restrict the utility of an
agent for an outcome to be 1: ui(c) can be as large as m. Specifically, let Vi = maxc∈F ui(c), and
Vmax = maxi∈N Vi. Our results differ by the feasibility constraints imposed on the outcome. We
consider three types of constraints, special cases of which have been studied previously in literature.
Matroid Constraints. In this setting, we are given a matroid M over the ground set W , and
the feasibility constraint is that the chosen elements must form a basis of M (see [22] for a formal
introduction to matroids).
This generalizes the public decision making setting introduced by [10]. In this setting, there
is a set of issues T , and each issue t ∈ T has an associated set of alternatives At = {at1, . . . , a
t
kt
},
exactly one of which must be chosen. Agent i has utility uti(a
t
j) if alternative a
t
j is chosen for issue
t, and utilities are additive across issues. An outcome c chooses one alternative for every issue. It
is easy to see that if the ground set is ∪tA
t, the feasibility constraints correspond to a partition
matroid. We note that public decision making in turn generalizes the classical setting of private
goods allocation [24, 9, 30] in which private goods must be divided among agents with additive
utilities, with each good allocated to exactly one agent.
Matroid constraints also capture multi-winner elections in the voting literature (see, e.g. [3]),
in which voters have additive utilities over candidates, and a committee of at most k candidates
must be chosen. This is captured by a uniform matroid over the set of candidates.
Matching Constraints. In this setting, the elements are edges of an undirected graph G(V,E),
and the feasibility constraint is that the subset of edges chosen must form a matching. Matchings
constraints in a bipartite graph can be seen as the intersection of two matroid constraints. Matching
constraints are a special case of the more general packing constraints we consider below.
Packing Constraints. In this setting, we impose a set of packing constraints Ax ≤ b, where
xj ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator denoting whether element j is chosen in the outcome. Suppose A is
a K ×m matrix, so that there are K packing constraints. By scaling, we can assume akj ∈ [0, 1]
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for all k, j. Note that even for one agent, packing constraints encode independent set. Thus, to
make the problem tractable, we assume b is sufficiently large, in particular, bk = ω (logK) for all
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. This is in contrast to matroid and matching constraints, for which single-agent
problems are polynomial time solvable. A classic measure of how easy it is to satisfy the packing
constraints is the width ρ [31]:
ρ = max
k∈[K]
∑
j∈[m] akj
bk
. (1)
Packing constraints capture the general Knapsack setting, in which there is a set of m items,
each item j has an associated size sj, and a set of items of total size at most B must be selected.
This setting is motivated by participatory budgeting applications [29, 18, 17, 11, 15, 12, 6], in which
the items are public projects, and the sizes represents the costs of the projects. Knapsack uses
a single packing constraint. Multiple packing constraints can arise if the projects consume several
types of resources, and there is a budget constraint for each resource type. For example, consider a
statewide participatory budgeting scenario where each county has a budget than can only be spent
on projects affecting that county, the state has some budget that can be spent in any county, and
projects might affect multiple counties. In such settings, it is natural to assume a small width, i.e.,
that the budget for each resource is such that a large fraction (but not all) of the projects can be
funded. We note that the aforementioned multi-winner election problem is a special case of the
Knapsack problem with unit sizes.
1.2 Prior Work: Fairness Properties
We define fairness desiderata for the public goods setting by generalizing appropriate desiderata
from the private goods setting such as Pareto optimality, which is a weak notion of efficiency, and
proportionality, which is a per-agent fair share guarantee.1
Definition 1. An outcome c satisfies Pareto optimality if there is no other outcome c′ such that
ui(c
′) ≥ ui(c) for all agents i ∈ N , and at least one inequality is strict.
Recall that Vi is the maximum possible utility agent i can derive from a feasible outcome.
Definition 2. The proportional share of an agent i ∈ N is Propi :=
Vi
n . For β ∈ (0, 1], we say
that an outcome c satisfies β-proportionality if ui(c) ≥ β ·Propi for all agents i ∈ N . If β = 1, we
simply say that c satisfies proportionality.
The difficulty in our setting stems from requiring integral outcomes, and not allowing random-
ization. In the absence of randomization, it is reasonably straightforward to show that we cannot
guarantee β-proportionality for any β ∈ (0, 1]. Consider a problem instance with two agents and
two feasible outcomes, where each outcome gives a positive utility to a unique agent. In any feasible
outcome, one agent has zero utility, which violates β-proportionality for every β > 0.
To address this issue, [10] introduced the novel relaxation of proportionality up to one issue in
their public decision making framework, inspired by a similar relaxation called envy-freeness up
to one good in the private goods setting [24, 9]. They say that an outcome c of a public decision
making problem satisfies proportionality up to one issue if for all agents i ∈ N , there exists an
outcome c′ that differs from c only on a single issue and ui(c
′) ≥ Propi. Proportionality up to one
issue is a reasonable fairness guarantees only when the number of issues is larger than the number
1Those familiar with the literature on fair division of private goods will note the conspicuous absence of the envy
freeness property: that no agent should (strongly) prefer the allocation of another agent. Because we are considering
public goods, envy freeness is only vacuously defined: the outcome in our setting is common to all agents.
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of agents; otherwise, it is vacuous and is satisfied by all outcomes. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable
for some applications (e.g., three friends choosing a movie list to watch together over the course of
a year), but not for others (e.g., when thousands of residents choose a handful of public projects to
finance). In fact, it may produce an outcome that may be construed as unfair if it does not reflect
the wishes of large groups of voters. Thus, in this work, we address the following question posed
by [10]:
Is there a stronger fairness notion than proportionality in the public decision making
framework...? Although such a notion would not be satisfiable by deterministic mecha-
nisms, it may be satisfied by randomized mechanisms, or it could have novel relaxations
that may be of independent interest.
1.3 Summary of Contributions
Our primary contributions are twofold.
• We define a fairness notion for public goods allocation that is stronger than proportionality,
ensures fair representation of groups of agents, and in particular, provides a meaningful
fairness guarantee even when there are fewer goods than agents.
• We provide polynomial time algorithms for computing integer allocations that approximately
satisfy this fairness guarantee for a variety of settings generalizing the public decision making
framework and participatory budgeting.
1.4 Core and Approximate Core Outcomes
Below, we define the notion of core outcomes, which has been extensively studied (in similar
forms) as a notion of stability in economics [13, 34, 26] and computer science [23, 11] in the context
of randomized or fractional allocations. Our main contribution is to study it in the context of
integer allocations.
Definition 3. Given an outcome c, we say that a set of agents S ⊆ N form a blocking coalition if
there exists an outcome c′ such that (|S|/n) · ui(c
′) ≥ ui(c) for all i ∈ S and at least one inequality
is strict. We say that an outcome c is a core outcome if it admits no blocking coalitions.
Note that non-existence of blocking coalitions of size 1 is equivalent to proportionality, and non-
existence of blocking coalitions of size n is equivalent to Pareto optimality. Hence, a core outcome is
both proportional and Pareto optimal. However, the core satisfies a stronger property of being, in
a sense, Pareto optimal for coalitions of any size, provided we scale utilities based on the size of the
coalition. Another way of thinking about the core is to view it as a fairness property that enforces
a proportionality-like guarantee for coalitions: e.g., if half of all agents have identical preferences,
they should be able to get at least half of their maximum possible utility. It is important to note
that the core provides a guarantee for every possible coalition. Hence, in satisfying the guarantee
for a coalition S, a solution cannot simply make a single member i ∈ S happy and ignore the rest
as this would likely violate the guarantee for the coalition S \ {i}.
Approximate Core. Since a proportional outcome is not guaranteed to exist (even allowing for
multiplicative approximations), the same is true for the core. However, an additive approximation
to the core still provides a meaningful guarantee, even when there are fewer elements than agents
because it provides a non-trivial guarantee to large coalitions of like-minded agents.
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Definition 4. For δ, α ≥ 0, an outcome c is a (δ, α)-core outcome if there exists no set of agents
S ⊆ N and outcome c′ such that
|S|
n
· ui(c
′) ≥ (1 + δ) · ui(c) + α
for all i ∈ S, and at least one inequality is strict.
A (0, 0)-core outcome is simply a core outcome. A (δ, 0)-core outcome satisfies δ-proportionality.
Similarly, a (0, 1)-core outcome c satisfies the following relaxation of proportionality that is slightly
weaker than proportionality up to one issue: for every agent i ∈ N , ui(c) + 1 ≥ Propi. We note
that this definition, and by extension, our algorithms satisfy scale invariance, i.e., they are invariant
to scaling the utilities of any individual agent. Because we normalize utilities of the agents, the
true additive guarantee is α times the maximum utility an agent can derive from a single element.
Since an outcome can have many elements, an approximation with small α remains meaningful.
The advantage of an approximate core outcome is that it fairly reflects the will of a like-minded
subpopulation relative to its size. An outcome satisfying approximate proportionality only looks
at what individual agents prefer, and may or may not respect the collective preferences of sub-
populations. We present such an instance in Example 1 (Section 2.1), in effect showing that an
approximate core outcome is arguably more fair.
In our results, we will assume δ < 1 to be a small constant, and focus on making α as small as
possible. In particular, we desire guarantees on α that exhibit sub-linear or no dependence on n,
m, or any other parameters. Deriving such bounds is the main technical focus of our work.
1.5 Our Results
We present algorithms to find approximate core outcomes under matroid, matching, and general
packing constraints. Our first result (Section 3) is the following:
Theorem 1. If feasible outcomes are constrained to be bases of a matroid, then a (0, 2)-core outcome
is guaranteed to exist, and for any ǫ > 0, a (0, 2 + ǫ)-core outcome can be computed in time
polynomial in n,m, and 1/ǫ.
In particular, for the public decision making framework, the private goods setting, and multi-
winner elections (a.k.a. Knapsack with unit sizes), there is an outcome whose guarantee for every
coalition is close to the guarantee that Conitzer et al. provide to individual agents [10].
In Section 4, we consider matching constraints. Our result now involves a tradeoff between the
multiplicative and additive guarantees.
Theorem 2. If feasible outcomes are constrained to be matchings in an undirected graph, then for
constant δ ∈ (0, 1], a (δ, 8 + 6/δ)-core outcome can be computed in time polynomial in n and m.
Our results in Section 5 are for general packing constraints. Here, our guarantee depends on the
width ρ from Equation (1), which captures the difficulty of satisfying the constraints. In particular,
the guarantee improves if the constraints are easier to satisfy. This is the most technical result
of the paper, and involves different techniques than those used in proving Theorems 1 and 2; we
present an outline of the techniques in Section 5.2.
Theorem 3. For constant δ ∈ (0, 1), given K packing constraints Ax ≤ b with width ρ and
bk = ω
(
logK
δ2
)
for all k ∈ [K], there exists a polynomial time computable (δ, α)-core solution, where
α = O
(
1
δ4
· log
(
min(Vmax, n, ρ) · log
∗ Vmax
δ
))
.
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Here, log∗ is the iterated logarithm, which is the number of times the logarithm function must
be iteratively applied before the result becomes less than or equal to 1. Recall that Vmax is the
maximum utility an agent can have for an outcome (thus Vmax ≤ m); our additive error bound is
a vanishing fraction of this quantity. Our bound is also small if the number of agents n is small.
Finally, the guarantee improves for small ρ, i.e., as the packing constraints become easier to satisfy.
For instance, in participatory budgeting, if the total cost of all projects is only a constant times
more than the budget, then our additive guarantee is close to a constant.
Note that Vmax (which is bounded by m), n, and ρ are all unrelated quantities — either could
be large with the other two being small. In fact, in Section 5, we state the bound more generally
in terms of what we call the maximally proportionally fair value R, which informally captures the
(existential) difficulty of finding a proportionally fair allocation. The quantity min(Vmax, n, ρ) stems
from three different bounds on the value of R.
In Example 2 (Appendix A), we show that the lower bound on b in the above theorem is
necessary: if b = O(1), then no non-trivial approximation to the core can be guaranteed, even
when ρ is a constant.
Finally, in Appendix C, we consider a different (and more classical) version of the core for general
packing constraints, in which a deviating coalition gets a proportional share of resources rather than
a proportional share of utility. We show that our techniques provide a similar approximation to
this version of the core, although we do not provide an efficient algorithm in this model.
1.6 Related Work
Core for Public Goods. The notion of core is borrowed from cooperative game theory and
was first phrased in game theoretic terms by [34]. It has been extensively studied in public goods
settings [13, 26, 11]. Most literature so far has considered the core with fractional allocations. Our
definition of core (Definition 3) assumes the utility of a deviating coalition is scaled by the size
of the coalition. For fractional allocations, one such core allocation coincides with the well-known
notion of proportional fairness, the extension of the Nash bargaining solution [27]. This solution
maximizes the product of the utilities of the agents, and we present the folklore proof in Section 2.2.
Our main focus is on finding integer allocations that approximate the core, and to the best of our
knowledge, this has not been studied previously.
A simpler property than the core is proportionality, which like the core, is impossible to satisfy
to any multiplicative approximation using integral allocations. To address this problem, [10] defined
proportionality up to one issue in the public decision making framework, inspired by related notions
for private goods. This guarantee is satisfied by the integral outcome maximizing the Nash welfare
objective, which is the geometric mean of the utilities to the agents. For public goods, this objective
is not only NP-Hard to approximate to any multiplicative factor, but approximations to the
objective also do not retain the individual fairness guarantees.
We extend the notion of additive approximate proportionality to additive approximate core
outcomes, which provides meaningful guarantees even when there are fewer goods than agents.
Unlike proportionality, we show in Section 2.1 that the approach of computing the optimal integral
solution to the Nash welfare objective fails to provide a reasonable approximation to the core.
Therefore, for our results about matroid constraints (Theorem 1) and matching constraints (The-
orem 2), we slightly modify the integer Nash welfare objective and add a suitable constant term
to the utility of each agent. We show that maximizing this smooth objective function achieves a
good approximation to the core. However, maximizing this objective is still NP-hard [12], so we
devise local search procedures that run in polynomial time and still give good approximations of
6
the core. In effect, we make a novel connection between appropriate local optima of smooth Nash
Welfare objectives and the core.
Fairness on Endowments. Classically, the core is defined in terms of agent endowments, not
scaled utilities. In more detail, in Definition 3, we assumed that when a subset S of agents deviates,
they can choose any feasible outcome; however, their utility is reduced by a factor that depends
on |S|. A different notion of core is based on endowments [34, 13] and has been considered in the
context of participatory budgeting [11] and in proportional representation of voters in multi-winner
elections with approval voting. In this notion, a deviating coalition gets a proportional share of
resources rather than a proportional share of utility. For example, if the elements have different
sizes, and we need to select a subset of them with total size at most B, then a deviating coalition S
would get to choose an outcome with total size at most B|S|/n instead of B, but would not have its
utility scaled down. This notion builds on the seminal work of Foley on the Lindahl equilibrium [13],
from which it can be shown that such a core outcome always exists when fractional allocations are
allowed. However, it is not known how to compute such a core outcome efficiently, and further, it is
difficult to define such a notion of endowments in settings such as matroid or matching constraints.
In the context of integer allocations with packing constraints, we extend our techniques to provide
approximations to the notion of core with endowments in Appendix C, though this is not the main
focus of our paper.
The notion of core with endowments logically implies a number of fairness notions considered
in multi-winner election literature, such as justified representation, extended justified representa-
tion [3], and proportional justified representation [33]. Approval-based multi-winner elections are a
special case of packing constraints, in which voters (agents) have binary utilities over a pool of can-
didates (elements), and we must select a set of at most B candidates. The idea behind proportional
representation is to define a notion of large cohesive groups of agents with similar preferences, and
ensure that such coalitions are proportionally represented. The core on endowments represents a
more general condition that holds for all coalitions of agents, not just those that are large and
cohesive. Nevertheless, our local search algorithms for Theorems 1 and 2 are similar to local search
algorithms for proportional approval voting (PAV) [36, 4] that achieve proportional representation.
It would be interesting to explore the connection between these various notions in greater depth.
Private Goods and Envy-freeness. Private goods are a special case of public goods with
matroid constraints. Fair allocation of private goods is a widely studied topic [37, 16, 28, 21].
A common fairness criterion for private goods is envy-freeness: that no agent should (strongly)
prefer the allocation of another agent. For fractional allocations, the classic context for envy-free
allocation is cake cutting [32, 5]. For integral allocations, envy-free allocations or multiplicative
approximations thereof may not exist in general. Recent work has introduced envy-freeness up
to one good [24, 8, 9, 30], an additive approximation of envy-freeness. The notion of envy does
not extend as is to public goods, and the core can be thought of as enforcing envy-freeness across
demographics. We note that in addition to resource allocation, group based fairness is also appear-
ing as a desideratum in machine learning. Specifically, related notions may provide a tool against
gerrymandered classifiers that appear fair on small samples, but not on structured subsets [20].
Strategyproofness. In this work, we will not consider game-theoretic incentives for manipu-
lation for two reasons. First, even for the restricted case of private goods allocation, preventing
manipulation leads to severely restricted mechanisms. For instance, [35] shows that the only strat-
egyproof and Pareto efficient mechanisms are dictatorial, and thus highly unfair, even when there
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are only two agents with additive utilities over divisible goods. Second, our work is motivated
by public goods settings with a large number of agents, such as participatory budgeting, wherein
individual agents often have limited influence over the final outcome. It would be interesting to
establish this formally, using notions like strategyproofness in the large [2].
2 Prelude: Nash Social Welfare
Our approach to computing approximate core solutions revolves around the Nash social welfare,
which is the product (or equivalently, the sum of logarithms) of agent utilities. This objective is
commonly considered to be a natural tradeoff between the fairness-blind utilitarian social welfare
objective (maximizing the sum of agent utilities) and the efficiency-blind egalitarian social welfare
objective (maximizing the minimum agent utility). This function also has the advantage of being
scale invariant with respect to the utility function of each agent, and in general, preferring more
equal distributions of utility.
2.1 Integer Nash Welfare and Smooth Variants
The integerMax Nash Welfare (MNW) solution [9, 10] is an outcome c that maximizes
∑
i∈N lnui(c).
More technically, if every integer allocation gives zero utility to at least one agent, the MNW so-
lution first chooses a largest set S of agents that can be given non-zero utility simultaneously, and
maximizes the product of utilities to agents in S.
[10] argue that this allocation is reasonable by showing that it satisfies proportionality up to one
issue for public decision making. A natural question is whether it also provides an approximation
of the core. We answer this question in the negative. The example below shows that even for
public decision making (a special case of matroid constraints), the integer MNW solution may fail
to return a (δ, α)-core outcome, for any δ = o(m) and α = o(m).
Example 1. Consider an instance of public decision making [10] withm issues and two alternatives
per issue. Specifically, each issue t has two alternatives {at1, a
t
2}, and exactly one of them needs to
be chosen. There are two sets of agents X = {1, . . . ,m} and Y = {m+ 1, . . . , 2m}. Every agent
i ∈ X has uii(a
i
1) = 1, and utility 0 for all other alternatives. Every agent i ∈ Y has u
t
i(a
t
2) = 1 and
uti(a
t
1) = 1/m for all issues i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. Visually, this is represented as follows.
a11 a
1
2 a
2
1 a
2
2 . . . a
m
1 a
m
2
u1∈X 1 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
u2∈X 0 0 1 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
um∈X 0 0 0 0 . . . 1 0
ui∈Y 1/m 1 1/m 1 . . . 1/m 1
The integer MNW outcome is c = (a11, a
2
1, . . . , a
m
1 ) because any other outcome gives zero utility
to at least one agent. However, coalition Y can deviate, choose outcome c′ = (a12, a
2
2, . . . , a
m
2 ), and
achieve utility m for each agent in Y . For c to be a (δ, α)-core outcome, we need
∃i ∈ Y : (1 + δ) · ui(c) + α ≥
|Y |
|Y |+ |X|
· ui(c
′) ⇒ 1 + δ + α ≥
m
2
.
Hence, c is not a (δ, α)-core outcome for any δ = o(m) and α = o(m). In contrast, it is not hard to
see that c′ is a (0, 1)-core outcome because each agent in X gets utility at most one in any outcome.
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Further, note that outcome c gives every agent utility 1. Since Propi ≤ 1 for each agent i,
c satisfies proportionality, and yet fails to provide a reasonable approximation to the core. One
may argue that c′, which is a (0, 1)-core outcome, is indeed fairer because it respects the utility-
maximizing choice of half of the population; the other half of the population cannot agree on what
they want, so respecting their top choice is arguably a less fair outcome. Hence, the example also
shows that outcomes satisfying proportionality (or proportionality up to one issue) can be very
different from and less fair than approximate core outcomes.
Smooth Nash Welfare. One issue with the Nash welfare objective is that it is sensitive to
agents receiving zero utility. We therefore consider the following smooth Nash welfare objective:
F (c) :=
∑
i∈N
ln (ℓ+ ui(c)) (2)
where ℓ ≥ 0 is a parameter. Note that ℓ = 0 coincides with the Nash welfare objective. The case of
ℓ = 1 was considered by [12], who showed it is NP-Hard to optimize. Recall that we normalized
agent utilities so that each agent has a maximum utility of 1 for any element, so when we add ℓ to
the utility of agent i, it is equivalent to adding ℓmaxj uij to the utility of agent i when utilities are
not normalized.
We show that local search procedures for the smooth Nash welfare objective, for appropriate
choices of ℓ, yield a (0, 2)-core outcome for matroid constraints (Section 3) and a
(
δ,O
(
1
δ
))
-core
outcome for matching constraints (Section 4). In contrast, in Example 3 (Appendix A) we show
that optimizing any fixed smooth Nash welfare objective cannot guarantee a good approximation
to the core, even with a single packing constraint, motivating the need for a different algorithm.
2.2 Fractional Max Nash Welfare Solution
For general packing constraints, we use a fractional relaxation of the Nash welfare program. A
fractional outcome consists of a vector w such that wj ∈ [0, 1] measures the fraction of element
j chosen. The utility of agent i under this outcome is ui(w) =
∑m
j=1wjuij . The fractional Max
Nash Welfare (MNW) solution is a fractional allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare objective
(without any smoothing). Define the packing polytope as:
P =
{
w ∈ [0, 1]m |
∑m
j=1 akjwj ≤ bk,∀k ∈ [K]
}
Then the fractional MNW solution is argmaxc∈P
∑
i lnui(c).
It is easy to show that the fractional MNW allocation lies in the core. Let c denote the optimal
fractional allocation to the MNW program. By first order optimality, for any other allocation d,
∇ lnu(c) · (u(d)− u(c)) ≤ 0 ⇒
∑
i∈N
1
ui(c)
(ui(d)− ui(c)) ≤ 0 ⇒
∑
i∈N
ui(d)
ui(c)
≤ n. (3)
Suppose for contradiction that c is not a core outcome. Then there exists a set of agents
S ⊆ N and an outcome d such that ui(d) ≥ (n/|S|) · ui(c), and at least one inequality is tight.
This implies
∑
i∈S ui(d)/ui(c) > n. However, this contradicts Equation (3). Thus c, the optimal
fractional solution to the MNW program, is a core solution.
For the allocation of public goods, it can be shown that the fractional MNW outcome can be
irrational despite rational inputs [1], preventing an exact algorithm. For our approximation results,
a fractional solution that approximately preserves the utility to each agent would suffice, and we
prove the following theorem in Appendix B.1.
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Theorem 4. For any ǫ, δ > 0, we can compute a fractional (δ, ǫ)-core outcome in time polynomial
in the input size and log 1ǫδ .
3 Matroid Constraints
We now consider public goods allocation with matroid constraints. In particular, we show that
when the feasibility constraints encode independent sets of a matroid M, maximizing the smooth
Nash welfare objective in Equation (2) with ℓ = 1 yields a (0, 2)-core outcome. However, optimizing
this objective is known to beNP-hard [12]. We also show that given ǫ > 0, a local search procedure
for this objective function (given below) yields a (0, 2 + ǫ)-core outcome in polynomial time, which
proves Theorem 1.
3.1 Algorithm
Fix ǫ > 0. Let γ = ǫ4m , where m = |W | is the number of elements. Recall that there are n
agents.
1. Start with an arbitrary basis c of M.
2. Compute F (c) =
∑
i∈N ln(1 + ui(c)).
3. Let a swap be a pair (j, j′) such that j ∈ c, j′ /∈ c, and c′ = c\{j}∪{j′} is also a basis ofM.
4. Find a swap such that F (c′)− F (c) ≥ nγm .
• If such a swap exists, then perform the swap, i.e., update c← c′, and go to Step (2).
• If no such swap exists, then output c as the final outcome.
3.2 Analysis
First, we show that the local search algorithm runs in time polynomial in n, m, and 1/ǫ. Note
that F (c) = O(n lnm) because in our normalization, each agent can have utility at most m. Thus,
the number of iterations is O
(
m2 logm/ǫ
)
. Finally, each iteration can be implemented in O(n ·m2)
time by iterating over all pairs and computing the change in the smooth Nash welfare objective.
Next, let c∗ denote the outcome maximizing the smooth Nash welfare objective with ℓ = 1,
and ĉ denote the outcome returned by the local search algorithm. We show that c∗ is a (0, 2)-core
outcome, while ĉ is a (0, 2 + ǫ)-core outcome.
For outcome c, define Fi(c) = ln(1 + ui(c)). Fix an arbitrary outcome c. For an agent i with
ui(c) > 0, we have that for every element j ∈ c:
Fi(c) − Fi(c \ {j}) ≤
uij
ui(c) + 1− uij
≤
uij
ui(c)
.
This holds because ln(x+ h)− lnx ≤ hx for x > 0 and h ≥ 0. Summing this over all j ∈ c gives∑
j∈c
Fi(c)− Fi(c \ {j}) ≤
∑
j∈c
uij
ui(c)
=
ui(c)
ui(c)
= 1.
For an agent i with ui(c) = 0, we trivially have
∑
j∈c Fi(c) − Fi(c \ {j}) = 0. Summing over all
agents, we have that for every outcome c:∑
j∈c
F (c) − F (c \ {j}) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈c
Fi(c)− Fi(c \ {j}) ≤ n. (4)
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We now use the following result:
Lemma 1 ([22]). For every pair of bases c and c′ of a matroid M, there is a bijection f : c→ c′
such that for every j ∈ c, c \ {j} ∪ {f(j)} is also a basis.
Using the above lemma, combined with the fact that ln(x+h)− lnx ≥ hx+h for x > 0 and h ≥ 0,
we have that for all c, c′:∑
j∈c
F (c \ {j} ∪ {f(j)}) − F (c \ {j}) ≥
∑
i
∑
j∈c
uif(j)
ui(c) + 1− uij + uif(j)
≥
∑
i∈S
∑
j′∈c′
uij′
ui(c) + 2
=
∑
i∈S
ui(c
′)
ui(c) + 2
. (5)
We now provide almost similar proofs for the approximations achieved by the global optimum
c∗ and the local optimum ĉ.
Global optimum. Suppose for contradiction that c∗ is not a (0, 2)-core outcome. Then, there
exist a subset S of agents and an outcome c′ such that for all i ∈ S,
|S|
n
· ui(c
′) ≥ ui(c
∗) + 2,
and at least one inequality is strict. Rearranging the terms and summing over all i ∈ S, we obtain:∑
i∈S
ui(c
′)
ui(c∗) + 2
>
∑
i∈S
n
|S|
= n.
Combining this with Equation (5), and subtracting Equation (4) yields:∑
j∈c∗
(F (c∗ \ {j} ∪ {f(j)}) − F (c∗)) > 0.
This implies existence of a pair (j, f(j)) such that F (c∗\{j}∪{f(j)})−F (c∗) > 0, which contradicts
the optimality of c∗ because c∗ \ {j} ∪ {f(j)} is also a basis of M.
Local optimum. Similarly, suppose for contradiction that ĉ is not a (0, 2 + ǫ)-core outcome.
Then, there exist a subset S of agents and an outcome c′ such that for all i ∈ S,
|S|
n
· ui(c
′) ≥ ui(ĉ) + 2 + ǫ > (1 + γ) (ui(ĉ) + 2) .
Here, the final transition holds because γ < ǫ/(m + 2) ≤ ǫ/(ui(ĉ) + 2). Again, rearranging and
summing over all i ∈ S, we obtain:∑
i∈S
ui(c
′)
ui(ĉ) + 2
> (1 + γ)
∑
i∈S
n
|S|
≥ n · (1 + γ).
Once again, combining this with Equation (5), and subtracting Equation (4) yields:∑
j∈ĉ
(F (ĉ \ {j} ∪ {f(j)}) − F (ĉ)) > nγ.
This implies existence of a pair (j, f(j)) such that F (ĉ \ {j} ∪ {f(j)}) − F (ĉ) > nγ/m, which
violates local optimality of ĉ because ĉ \ {j} ∪ {f(j)} is also a basis of M.
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Lower Bound. While a (0, 2)-core always outcome exists, we show in the following example that
a (0, 1 − ǫ)-core outcome is not guaranteed to exist for any ǫ > 0.
Lemma 2. For ǫ > 0 and matroid constraints, (0, 1− ǫ)-core outcomes are not guaranteed to exist.
Proof. Consider the following instance of public decision making where we have several issues and
must choose a single alternative for each issue, a special case of matroid constraints. There are n
agents, where n is even. There are m = (n − 2) + n/2 issues. The first n − 2 issues correspond to
unit-value private goods, i.e., each such issue has n alternatives, and each alternative gives utility
1 to a unique agent and utility 0 to others. The remaining n/2 issues are “pair issues”; each such
issue has
(
n
2
)
alternatives, one corresponding to every pair of agents that gives both agents in the
pair utility 1 and all other agents utility 0.
It is easy to see that every integer allocation gives utility at most 1 to at least two agents.
Consider the deviating coalition consisting of these two agents. They can choose the alternative
that gives them each utility 1 on every pair issue, and split the n− 2 private goods equally. Thus,
they each get utility n/2 + (n − 2)/2 = n − 1. For the outcome to be a (0, α)-core outcome, we
need 1+α ≥ (2/n) · (n− 1). As n→∞, this requires α→ 1. Hence, for any ǫ > 0, a (0, 1− ǫ)-core
outcome is not guaranteed to exist.
Note that Theorem 1 shows existence of a (0, 2)-core outcome, which is therefore tight up to
a unit additive relaxation. Whether a (0, 1)-core outcome always exists under matroid constraints
remains an important open question. Interestingly, we show that such an outcome always exists
for the special case of private goods allocation, and, in fact, can be achieved by maximizing the
smooth Nash welfare objective.
Lemma 3. For private goods allocation, maximizing the smooth Nash welfare objective with ℓ = 1
returns a (0, 1)-core outcome.
Proof. There is a set of agents N and a set of private goods M . Each agent i ∈ N has a utility
function ui : 2
M → R≥0. Utilities are additive, so ui(S) =
∑
g∈S ui({g}) for all S ⊆ M . For
simplicity, we denote uig , ui({g}). Without loss of generality, we normalize the utility of each
agent such that maxg∈M uig = 1 for each i. An allocation A is a partition of the set of goods
among the agents; let Ai denote the bundle of goods received by agent i. We want to show that an
allocation maximizing the objective
∏
i∈N (1 + ui(Ai)) is a (0, 1)-core outcome.
Let A denote an allocation maximizing the smooth Nash welfare objective with ℓ = 1. We
assume without loss of generality that every good is positively valued by at least one agent. Hence,
uj(Aj) = 0 must imply Aj = ∅.
For agents i, j ∈ N with Aj 6= ∅ (hence uj(Aj) > 0), and good g ∈ Aj , moving g to Ai should
not increase the objective function. Hence, for each g ∈ Aj , we have(
1 + ui(Ai ∪ {g})
)
·
(
1 + uj(Aj \ {g})
)
≤
(
1 + ui(Ai)
)
·
(
1 + uj(Aj)
)
.
Using additivity of utilities, this simplifies to
uig
1 + ui(Ai)
≤
ujg
1 + uj(Aj)− ujg
≤
ujg
uj(Aj)
. (6)
For every agent j ∈ N with Aj 6= ∅ and good g ∈ Aj , define pg = ujg/uj(Aj). Abusing the
notation a little, for a set T ⊆M define pT =
∑
g∈T pg. Then, from Equation (6), we have that for
all players i ∈ N and goods g ∈M ,
(1 + ui(Ai)) · pg ≥ uig. (7)
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Suppose for contradiction that A is not a (0, 1)-core outcome. Then, there exists a set of agents
S ⊆ N and an allocation B of the set of all goods to agents in S such that (|S|/n)·ui(Bi) ≥ 1+ui(Ai)
for every agent i ∈ S, and at least one inequality is strict. Rearranging the terms and summing
over i ∈ S, we have ∑
i∈S
ui(Bi)
1 + ui(Ai)
>
∑
i∈S
n
|S|
= n. (8)
We now derive a contradiction. For agent i ∈ S, summing Equation (7) over g ∈ Bi, we get
(1 + ui(Ai)) · pBi ≥ ui(Bi)⇒
ui(Bi)
1 + ui(Ai)
≤ pBi .
Summing this over i ∈ S, we get∑
i∈S
ui(Bi)
1 + ui(Ai)
≤
∑
i∈S
pBi =
∑
g∈M
pg =
∑
j∈N s.t.
Aj 6=∅
∑
g∈Aj
ujg
uj(Aj)
=
∑
j∈N s.t.
Aj 6=∅
uj(Aj)
uj(Aj)
≤ n.
However, this contradicts Equation (8).
4 Matching Constraints
We now present the algorithm proving Theorem 2. We show that if the elements are edges of
an undirected graph G(V,E), and the feasibility constraints encode a matching, then for constant
δ ∈ (0, 1], a (δ, 8 + 6δ )-core always exists and is efficiently computable. The idea is to again run a
local search on the smooth Nash welfare objective in Equation (2), but this time with ℓ ≈ 1 + 4δ .
Algorithm. Recall that there are n agents. Let |V | = r and |E| = m. Let κ = 2δ . For simplicity,
assume κ ∈ N. Our algorithm is inspired by the PRAM algorithm for approximate maximum weight
matchings due to [19], and we follow their terminology. Given a matching c, an augmentation with
respect to c is a matching T ⊆ E \ c. The size of the augmentation is |T |. Let M(T ) denote the
subset of edges of c that have a vertex which is matched under T . Then, the matching (c \M(T ))∪T
is called the augmentation of c using T .
1. Start with an arbitrary matching c of G.
2. Compute F (c) =
∑
i ln (1 + 2κ+ ui(c)).
3. Let C be the set of all augmentations with respect to c of size at most κ.
• If there exists T ∈ C such that F ((c \M(T ))∪T )−F (c) ≥ nκr , perform this augmentation
(i.e., let c← (c \M(T )) ∪ T ) and go to Step (2).
• Otherwise, output c as the final outcome.
Analysis. The outline of the analysis is similar to the analysis for matroid constraints. First, we
show that the algorithm runs in polynomial time. Again, recall that each agent has utility at most
m. Thus, F (c) = O(n · lnm). Because each improvement increases the objective value by at least
n/(κr), the number of iterations is O(κr lnm) = O(m2/δ). Each iteration can be implemented
by na¨ıvely going over all O(mκ) subsets of edges of size at most κ, checking if they are valid
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augmentations with respect to c, and whether they improve the objective function by more than
n/(κr). The local search therefore runs in polynomial time for constant δ > 0.
Let c denote the outcome returned by the algorithm. We next show that c is indeed a (δ, 8+3κ)-
core outcome. Suppose for contradiction that this is not true. Then, there exist a subset of agents
S and a matching c′ such that for all i ∈ S,
|S|
n
· ui(c
′) ≥ (1 + δ) · ui(c) + 8 + 3κ ≥ (1 + δ) · (ui(c) + 3κ+ 1) ,
and at least one inequality is strict (the last inequality is because δ ∈ (0, 1]). Rearranging and
summing over all i ∈ S, we obtain∑
i∈S
ui(c
′)
ui(c) + 3κ+ 1
> (1 + δ) ·
∑
i∈S
n
|S|
= n · (1 + δ). (9)
For j ∈ E, define wj =
∑
i∈N
uij
ui(c)+1
and w′j =
∑
i∈N
uij
ui(c)+3κ+1
. Let W =
∑
j∈cwj , and
W ′ =
∑
j∈c′ w
′
j . It is easy to check that
W ≤ n and W ′ ≥ n · (1 + δ), (10)
where the latter follows from Equation (9). Further note that wj ≥ w
′
j for all j.
For an augmentation T with respect to c, define gain(T ) =
∑
j∈T w
′
j −
∑
j∈M(T )wj . The next
lemma is a simple generalization of the analysis in [19]; we give the adaptation here for completeness.
Lemma 4. Assuming weights wj ≥ w
′
j for all edges j, for any integer κ ≥ 1 and matchings c and
c′, there exists a multiset OPT of augmentations with respect to c such that:
• For each T ∈ OPT , T ⊆ c′ and |T | ≤ κ;
• |OPT | ≤ κr; and
•
∑
T∈OPT gain(T ) ≥ κ ·W
′ − (κ+ 1) ·W .
Proof. We follow [19] in the construction the multiset OPT of augmentations with respect to c out
of edges in c′. Let c△c′ be the symmetric difference of matchings c and c′ consisting of alternating
paths and cycles. For every cycle or path d ∈ c△c′, let Td be be set of edges d ∩ c
′. For all Td
with |Td| ≤ κ, just add TS to OPT κ times (note that OPT is a multiset, not a set). For Td with
|Td| > κ, we break up Td into multiple smaller augmentations. To do so, index the edges in Td
from 1 to |Td| and add |Td| different augmentations to OPT by considering starting at every index
in Td and including the next κ edges in Td with wrap-around from |Td| to 1.
Now we must argue that OPT as we have constructed it satisfies the conditions of the lemma.
The first point, that ∀T ∈ OPT, T ⊆ c′ and |T | ≤ κ, follows trivially from the construction. The
second point also follows easily from observing that we add κ augmentations to OPT for every
d ∈ c ∩ c′, and graph G has r vertices.
To see the third point, note that every edge in c′\c is contained in at least κ augmentations in
OPT . On the other hand, for every edge e ∈ c\c′, there are no more than κ + 1 augmentations
T ∈ OPT such that e ∈ M(T ) (recall M(T ) are the edges of c with a vertex matched under
T ). This can happen, for example, if TS happens to be a path of length κ + 1. Finally, for the
edges j ∈ c′ ∩ c, the weight w′j ≤ wj . Putting these facts together, the third point of the lemma
follows.
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Consider the set of augmentations OPT from Lemma 4. For augmentation T ∈ OPT , we have:
F ((c \M(T )) ∪ T )− F (c) =
(
F ((c \M(T )) ∪ T )− F (c \M(T ))
)
−
(
F (c) − F (c \M(T ))
)
≥
∑
i∈N
( ∑
T∈S uij
ui(c) + 2κ+ 1 +
∑
j∈T uij
−
∑
j∈M(T ) uij
ui(c) + 2κ+ 1−
∑
j∈M(T ) uij
)
≥
∑
i∈N
( ∑
j∈T uij
ui(c) + 3κ+ 1
−
∑
j∈M(T ) uij
ui(c) + 1
)
=
∑
j∈T
w′j −
∑
j∈M(T )
wj = gain(T ).
Here, the second transition holds because h/(x + h) ≤ ln(x + h) − lnx ≤ h/x for all x ≥ 1 and
h ≥ 0, and the third transition holds due to |T | ≤ κ and |M(T )| ≤ 2|T | ≤ 2κ. Therefore, we have:∑
T∈OPT
F ((c \M(T )) ∪ T )− F (c) ≥
∑
T∈OPT
gain(T ) ≥ κ ·W ′ − (κ+ 1) ·W
≥ κ · n · (1 + δ)− (κ+ 1) · n = n,
where the second transition follows from Lemma 4, and the third transition follows from Equa-
tion (10). Since |OPT | ≤ κr, there exists an augmentation T ∈ OPT with F ((c \M(T )) ∪ T ) −
F (c) ≥ n/κr, which violates local optimality of c. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
Lower Bound. We give a stronger lower bound for matchings than the lower bound for matroids
in Lemma 2.
Lemma 5. A (δ, α)-core outcome is not guaranteed to exist for matching constraints, for any δ ≥ 0
and α < 1.
Proof. This example shows that Consider the graph K2,2 (the complete bipartite graph with two
vertices on each side). This graph has four edges, and two disjoint perfect matchings.
Let there be two agents. Agent 1 has unit utility for the edges of one matching, while agent 2
has unit utility for the edges of the other matching. Any integer outcome gives zero utility to one of
these agents. This agent can deviate and obtain utility 2. Hence, for an outcome to be a (δ, α)-core
outcome, we need (1 + δ) · 0 + α ≥ (1/2) · 2, which is impossible for any δ ≥ 0 and α < 1.
5 General Packing Constraints
In this section, we study approximation to the core under general packing constraints of the
form Ax ≤ b. Recall that there are m elements, Vi is the maximum possible utility that agent i
can receive from a feasible outcome, and Vmax = maxi∈N Vi. We prove a statement slightly more
general than Theorem 3. We first need the following concept.
5.1 Maximal Proportionally Fair Outcome
Given an instance of public goods allocation subject to packing constraints, we define the notions
of an r-proportionally fair (r-PF) outcome, a maximally proportionally fair (MPF) outcome, and
the MPF value of the instance.
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Definition 5 (MPF Outcome). For r > 0, we say that a fractional outcome w is r-proportionally
fair (r-PF) if it satisfies:
ui(w) ≥
Vi
r
− 1, ∀i ∈ N.
The maximally proportionally fair (MPF) value R of an instance is the least value r such that there
exists an r-PF outcome. For simplicity, we say that an R-PF outcome is a maximally proportionally
fair (MPF) outcome.
This concept is crucial to stating and deriving our approximation results. In words, an r-PF
outcome gives each agent an r fraction of its maximum possible utility Vi (which can be thought
of as the fair share guarantee of the agent), if the agent is given 1 unit of utility for free. Thus, a
smaller value of r indicates a better solution. The MPF value R denotes the best possible guarantee.
The additive 1 in Def. 5 can be replaced by any positive constant; we choose 1 for simplicity.
We now show an upper bound for R that holds for all instances. Recall from Equation (1) that
ρ is the width of the instance.
Lemma 6. R ≤ min(Vmax, n, ρ), and an MPF outcome is computable in polynomial time.
Proof. To show that R is well-defined, note that for r = Vmax, an r-PF outcome w simply requires
ui(w) ≥ 0, which is trivially achieved by every outcome. Therefore, R is well-defined, andR ≤ Vmax.
Next, R ≤ n follows from the fact that there exist fractional outcomes satisfying proportionality
(e.g., the outcome w obtained by taking the uniform convex combination of the n outcomes that
give optimal to each individual agent). Finally, to show R ≤ ρ, consider the outcome w in which
wj =
1
ρ for each element j. Clearly, ui(w) ≥
Vi
ρ for all i. Further, Aw ≤ b is satisfied trivially due
to the fact that ρ is the width of the packing constraints.
To compute the value of R as well as an MPF outcome, we first note that the value of Vi for
each agent i can be computed by solving a separate LP. Then, we consider the following LP:
Maximize rˆ (11)∑
j∈W uijwj ≥ Vi · rˆ − 1 ∀i ∈ [n]
Aw ≤ b
wj ∈ [0, 1] ∀j ∈W
Here, Aw ≤ b are the packing constraints of the instance, and rˆ is a variable representing 1/r.
Thus, maximizing rˆ minimizes r, which yields an MPF outcome. This can be accomplished by
solving n+ 1 linear programs, which can be done in polynomial time.
Our main result in this section uses any r-PF outcome, and provides a guarantee in terms of
log r. Thus, we do not need to necessarily compute an exact MPF outcome. We note that an MPF
outcome can be very different from a core outcome. Yet, an MPF outcome gives each agent a large
fraction of its maximum possible utility, subject to a small additive relaxation. As we show below,
this helps us find integral outcomes that provide good approximations of the core.
5.2 Result and Proof Idea
Our main result for this section (Theorem 3) can be stated in a refined way as follows. Recall
that log∗ is the iterated logarithm, which is the number of times the logarithm function must be
iteratively applied before the result becomes less than or equal to 1.
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Theorem 5. Fix constant δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose we are given a set of K packing constraints Ax ≤ b
such that bk = ω
(
logK
δ2
)
for all k ∈ [K]. Let R be the MPF value of this instance. Then there
exists a polynomial time computable (δ, α)-core outcome, where
α = O
(
1
δ4
· log
(
R · log∗ Vmax
δ
))
.
We first note that the above result cannot be obtained by maximizing the smooth Nash welfare
objective; we present Example 3 in Appendix A, which demonstrates this using only one packing
constraint. To be precise, the example shows that no single value of parameter ℓ in the smooth
Nash welfare objective can provide a polylog additive guarantee for all instances. While it may be
possible to choose the value of ℓ based on the instance, it does not seem trivial. We take a different
approach. Our idea is to start with a fractional core solution x. Suppose it assigns utility U∗i to
agent i. Fix δ > 0, and consider the following program.
Minimize α (12)
α+ (1 + δ) ·
∑
j∈W uijwj ≥ U
∗
i ∀i ∈ [n]
Aw ≤ b
wj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈W
α ≥ 0
For the optimum value α∗, we obtain an outcome that is (δ, α′)-core for every α′ > α. To see
this, take a subset of agents S and a feasible utility vector U′ under any other (even fractional)
outcome. Because x is a core outcome, there exists i ∈ S such that U∗i ≥ (|S|/n) · U
′
i . For α
′ > α,
the ILP solution implies
α′ + (1 + δ) ·
∑
j∈W
uijwj > U
∗
i ≥
|S|
n
· U ′i ,
which implies that the solution is (δ, α′)-core according to Definition 4.
However, α∗ obtained from this program can be rather large, as illustrated in the following
example. Consider the Knapsack setting with m unit-size projects. There is an overall budget
B = m/2. For every feasible integral outcome c, let there be an agent with utility 1 for every
project in c and 0 for all other projects. Thus, there are
( m
m/2
)
agents. The fractional core outcome
gives weight 1/2 to each project, thus giving utility Vi/2 = m/4 to each agent i. However, every
integral outcome gives utility 0 to at least one agent, which implies α∗ = Ω(m).
This example shows that when there are a large number of agents, we cannot achieve Theorem 5
by hoping to approximately preserve the utilities to all agents with respect the fractional core
solution. However, note that in the above example, though there is one agent who gets very little
utility, this agent has no incentive to deviate if she is given one unit of utility for free. This insight
leads us to our analysis below, which is based on rounding the fractional core solution x.
Let us apply randomized rounding to x. Instead of using Chernoff bounds to ensure that there
are no “violations” (i.e., that no agent receives utility that is too far from its utility under the
core outcome x), we hope to bound the expected number of such violations. If there are few
such agents, we still have an approximate core outcome because if this small coalition of agents
deviates, its utility under a new outcome will be scaled down by a large factor. Unfortunately,
it can be shown that bounding the expected number of deviations by a sufficiently small number
forces α = Ω(log Vmax). This is better than α = Ω(m) from our previous approach, but still much
larger than the bound we want to achieve in Theorem 5 when the width ρ is small.
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This brings up the main technical idea. We observe that an MPF outcome, though not in the
core, provides a reasonably large utility to each agent. We add a small amount of this outcome
to the fractional core before applying randomized rounding. We are now ready to present our
algorithm.
5.3 Algorithm
Fix δ ∈ (0, 1), and let γ = δ8 .
1. Compute the (approximate) fractional core solution x as in Theorem 4, where xj is the
fraction of element j chosen.
2. Let y be an MPF outcome as in Definition 5.
3. Let z = (1− γ)x+ γy.
4. For each j ∈W , choose j to be in the outcome c independently with probability zˆj = (1−γ)zj .
5.4 Analysis
We show that this algorithm yields, with at least a constant probability, a feasible outcome
that satisfies the guarantee in Theorem 5. This directly shows the existence of such an outcome.
Note that the fractional Max Nash Welfare solution x can be irrational, but we can compute an
approximation in polynomial time (see Theorem 4 for details), which does not change our guarantee
asymptotically. Further, y can be computed in polynomial time (Lemma 6). Hence, the algorithm
runs in expected polynomial time.
We first show that the packing constraints are satisfied. Since we scale down z by a factor
(1 − γ) before rounding, we have Azˆ ≤ (1 − γ)b. Since b = ω
(
logK
δ2
)
, a simple application of
Chernoff bounds shows that with probability at least 0.99, the rounded solution c satisfies Ac ≤ b.
Therefore, if we show that the algorithm also yields the desired approximation of the core with at
least a constant probability (1/6 to be precise), we will be done by applying union bound to the
two events, feasibility and good approximation to the core.
For the ease of presentation, we suppress constants throughout the proof and use the asymptotic
notation liberally. We also assume that Vmax = ω(1) since otherwise there is a trivial (0, O(1))-core
outcome that chooses a null outcome, giving zero utility to each agent.
5.4.1 Grouping Agents
In order to analyze our algorithm, we partition the agents into groups with exponentially de-
creasing values of Vi. Recall that Vi is the maximum utility that agent i can get from any outcome.
Set Q0 = log Vmax, and for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , L− 1, define group Gℓ as:
Gℓ = {i ∈ N | Qℓ ≥ log Vi ≥ Qℓ+1} .
Here, for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , L− 1, we define: Qℓ+1 = 2 logQℓ.
We call G0, . . . , GL−1 the heavy groups. We choose L so that QL = Θ
(
log R log
∗ Vmax
γ3
)
. This
implies L = Ω(log∗ Vmax) = ω(1), since Vmax = ω(1). For agent i in a heavy group, Vi ≥ e
QL ≥
2RL
γ3 > 2R. Thus, the utility that the MPF solution provides to agent i is at least
Vi
R − 1 ≥
Vi
2R .
Finally, we put the remaining agents (with a small Vi) in a light group defined as follows:
GL = {i ∈ N | log Vi ≤ QL} .
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The MPF solution may not provide any guarantee for the utility of agents in this group.
5.4.2 Bounding Violations of Utility Preservation
We want to bound the number of agents whose utilities are far from those under the core
outcome. First, we need a specialized Chernoff bound.
Lemma 7. (Proved in Appendix B.2) Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xq be independent random variables in [0, 1],
and let X =
∑q
j=1Xj . For γ ∈ (0, 1/2), suppose E[X] = (1− γ) · A+ γ · B for A,B ≥ 0. Then
Pr[X < (1− 2γ) · A] ≤ e−
γ3
2
max(B,A/2)
Recall that x is the fractional MNW solution, y is the fractional MPF solution, and our algo-
rithm applies randomized rounding to their scaled down mixture (1− γ)z = (1− γ)2x+ γ(1− γ)y.
Let Ûi denote the utility of agent i under the final integral outcome obtained by randomly rounding
(1− γ)z. Recall that U∗i is the utility of agent i under the core outcome x. We want to show that
Ûi is either multiplicatively or additively close to U
∗
i for most agents. For a heavy group Gℓ, where
ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1}, define
Fℓ =
{
i ∈ Gℓ
∣∣∣ Ûi < (1− 3γ)U∗i } .
Simiarly, for the light group GL, define
FL =
{
i ∈ GL
∣∣∣∣ Ûi < min((1− 3γ)U∗i , U∗i − 4QLγ4
)}
.
We will use Lemma 7 to bound the sizes of Fℓ for ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L} as follows.
Theorem 6. We have that:
1. With probability at least 2/3, we have |Fℓ| ≤
1
2LeQℓ
· |Gℓ|, ∀ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1}.
2. With probability at least 1/2, we have |FL| ≤
1
2eQL
· |GL|.
Thus, with probability at least 1/6, both the above inequalities hold simultaneously.
Proof. We prove the first and the second part of Theorem 6 separately by considering the heavy
groups and the light group in turn. The combined result follows from the union bound.
Case 1: Heavy Groups Consider a heavy group Gℓ for 0 ≤ ℓ < L. Recall that the MPF
solution provides utility at least Vi/(2R) to each agent in a heavy group. Hence, we have:
E
[
Ûi/(1− γ)
]
= ui(z) ≥ (1− γ) · U
∗
i + γ ·
Vi
2R
. (13)
The key point is that even if U∗i is small, the expected utility is at least a term that is propor-
tional to Vi. This will strengthen our application of Chernoff bounds. Using Lemma 7 with A = U
∗
i
and B = Vi/(2R), we have:
Pr
[
Ûi < (1− 3γ) · U
∗
i
]
≤ Pr
[
Ûi
1− γ
< (1− 2γ) · U∗i
]
≤ e−
γ3
4
Vi
2R ≤ e−
γ3
8R
Q2ℓ
≤ e−Qℓ·logL ≤ e−(Qℓ+2 logL+log 6) ≤
1
6L2eQℓ
, (14)
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where the second inequality holds because log Vi ≥ 2 logQℓ, the third holds because Qℓ = Ω
(
RL
γ3
)
,
and the fourth holds because L = ω(1).
We are now ready to prove the first part of Theorem 6. Let ηℓ =
1
6L2eQℓ
. Recall that Fℓ consists
of agents in Gℓ for which Ûi < (1−3γ) ·U
∗
i . Using the linearity of expectation in Equation (14), we
have E[Fℓ] ≤ ηℓ · |Gℓ|. By Markov’s inequality, Pr [|Fℓ| > 3L · ηℓ · |Gℓ|] ≤
1
3L . Applying the union
bound over the L heavy groups, we have that with probability at least 2/3,
|Fℓ| ≤ 3L · ηℓ · |Gℓ| =
1
2LeQℓ
· |Gℓ|, ∀ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1},
which proves the first part of Theorem 6.
Case 2: Light Group For the light group, note that log Vi ≤ QL. For this group, the MPF
solution may not provide any non-trivial guarantee on the utility to the agents. Since the expected
utility can now be small, we have to allow additive approximation as well. Recall that FL consists
of agents in GL for whom Ûi < (1− 3γ) · U
∗
i as well as Ûi < U
∗
i − 4QL/γ
4. We again consider two
cases.
Case 1. If U∗i ≤
4
γ4
QL, then Ûi ≥ U
∗
i −
4QL
γ4
trivially.
Case 2. Otherwise, U∗i ≥
4QL
γ4
, and using Lemma 7, we have:
Pr
[
Ûi < (1− 3γ)U
∗
i
]
≤ Pr
[
Ûi
1− γ
< (1− 2γ)U∗i
]
≤ e−
γ3
4
U∗i ≤ e
− γ
3
4
·
4QL
γ4 ≤
1
4eQL
.
It is easy to check that the final transition holds because γ < 1 is a constant and QL = ω(1).
Note that none of the agents in FL are in Case 1. Hence, by Markov’s inequality, we again have:
Pr
[
|FL| ≥
1
2eQL
· |GL|
]
≤
1
2
,
which proves the second part of Theorem 6.
5.4.3 Approximate Core
We showed that with probability at least 1/6, our algorithm returns a solution that satisfies
conditions in both parts of Theorem 6. We now show that such a solution is the desired approximate
core solution. The main idea is that when a set of agents deviate, the fraction of agents in a group
Gℓ that are in Fℓ is small enough such that even if they receive their maximum possible utility,
which is eQℓ, their scaled down utility is at most a constant.
Theorem 7. For every coalition S and every possible outcome h, there exists an agent i ∈ S s.t.
|S|
n
· ui(h) ≤ (1 + 8γ) · Ûi +
5QL
γ4
.
Proof. Let W = N \ ∪Lℓ=0Fℓ. In other words, W is the set of agents who either receive a good
multiplicative approximation to their expected utility in the core (for the heavy groups), or a good
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additive approximation to their expected utility in the core (for the light group). In particular, for
every i ∈W , we have Ûi ≥ min
(
(1− 3γ) · U∗i , U
∗
i −
4QL
γ4
)
, which implies
U∗i ≤
1
1− 3γ
· Ûi +
4QL
γ4
. (15)
Consider a set of agents S that may want to deviate, and let h be any (even fractional) outcome.
There are two cases:
Case 1. Suppose |S ∩W | ≥ (1 − γ) · |S|. Then, due to the fractional core optimality condition
(see Section 2.2), we have: ∑
i∈S∩W
Ui(h)
U∗i
≤ n.
Note that in polynomial time, Theorem 4 only finds an approximate solution whose utilities {U˜i}
with
∑
i∈S∩W
Ui(h)
U˜i
≤ n(1 + η) for small η > 0. It is easy to check this does not alter the rest of
the proof and adds a small multiplicative factor of (1 + η) to the final approximation bound. We
ignore this factor for simplicity and simply assume {U∗i } are the optimal MNW utilities. The above
implies |S|n ·
∑
i∈S∩W
ui(h)
U∗i
≤ |S| ≤ 11−γ · |S ∩W |.
Therefore, there exists an agent i ∈ S ∩W such that
|S|
n
· ui(h) ≤
1
1− γ
· U∗i ≤
1
1− γ
·
(
1
1− 3γ
· Ûi +
4QL
γ4
)
,
where the last transition is due to Equation (15) and the fact that i ∈ W . Finally, it is easy to
check that for γ = δ/8 ≤ 1/8, we have 1(1−γ)·(1−3γ) ≤ 1 + 8γ and 4/(1 − γ) ≤ 5, which yields:
|S|
n
· ui(h) ≤ (1 + 8γ) · Ûi +
5QL
γ4
. (16)
Case 2. Otherwise, |S \W | ≥ γ|S|. In this case, we want to show that there exists an agent
i ∈ S \W such that (|S|/n) · ui(h) ≤ 1/γ. Because Ûi ≥ 0 and QL = ω(1), such an agent will also
satisfy Equation (16). We show this by taking two sub-cases.
First, suppose the light group satisfies |S ∩ FL| ≥
γ
2 |S|. Then: |S| ≤
2
γ · |S ∩ FL| ≤
2
γ · |FL|.
Thus, for any agent i ∈ FL, we have
|S|
n
· ui(h) ≤
2
γn
· |FL| · Vi ≤
2
γn
·
|GL|
2eQL
· Vi ≤
1
γ
.
Here, the second transition follows from Theorem 6. To see why the third transition holds, note
that |GL| ≤ n, and that log Vi ≤ QL because i ∈ GL.
Similarly, in the other sub-case, suppose |S ∩ FL| ≤
γ
2 |S|. Then, there exists a heavy group
ℓ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1} such that |S ∩ Fℓ| ≥
γ
2L |S|. This means |S| ≤
2L
γ · |S ∩ Fℓ| ≤
2L
γ · |Fℓ|.
Again, for an arbitrary agent i ∈ Fℓ, we have:
|S|
n
· ui(h) ≤
2L
γn
· |Fℓ| · Vi ≤
2L
γn
·
|Gℓ|
2LeQℓ
· Vi ≤
1
γ
.
Once again, the third transition follows from Theorem 6, and the fourth transition holds because
|Gℓ| ≤ n and log Vi ≤ Qℓ as i ∈ Gℓ. Putting everything together, the theorem follows.
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Since γ = δ8 and QL = Θ
(
log R log
∗ Vmax
γ
)
, Theorem 7 implies |S|n ·ui(h) ≤ (1+δ) ·Ûi+α
∗, where
α∗ = O
(
1
δ4
· log
(
R·log∗ Vmax
δ
))
. The existence of such an agent implies that a solution satisfying
Theorem 6 is a (δ, α)-core solution for every α > α∗, which completes the proof of Theorem 5.
6 Conclusion
We considered the problem of fairly allocating public goods. We argued that the core, which
is a generalization of proportionality and Pareto efficiency, and approximations of the core provide
reasonable fairness guarantees in this context. Given that no integral outcome may be in the core,
we presented efficient algorithms to produce integral outcomes that are constant or near-constant
approximations of the core, thereby also establishing the non-trivial existence of such outcomes.
Note that our algorithms for matroid and matching constraints that globally optimize the smooth
Nash welfare objective achieve exact rather than approximate Pareto efficiency, in addition to an
approximation of the core. An interesting question is whether the same guarantee can be provided
(regardless of computation time) for general packing constraints.
Another natural question following our work is to tighten our upper bounds, or to establish
matching lower bounds. For instance, we show the existence of a (0, 2)-core outcome for matroid
constraints (Theorem 1), but our lower bound only shows that a (0, 1 − ǫ)-core outcome may not
exist. This leaves open the question of whether a (0, 1)-core outcome always exists. Existence of
(0, 1)-core outcome is also an open question for matching constraints. For packing constraints, it is
unknown if even a (δ, α)-core outcome exists for constant δ > 0 and α = O(1). This also remains
an open question for the endowment-based notion of core we consider in Appendix C.
At a higher level, we established connections between approximating the core in our multi-agent
environment and the problem of finding the optimal (i.e., utility-maximizing) outcome for a single
agent. For instance, given matching constraints, our algorithm uses the idea of short augmenting
paths from fast PRAM algorithms. This hints at the possibility of a deeper connection between
efficiency results and existence results.
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Appendix
A Impossibility Examples
Example 2. The following example shows the necessity of assuming a large b in Theorem 3 for
general packing constraints. Specifically, the example uses packing constraints Ax ≤ b where b = 1
(and the width is ρ = 2), and does not admit a (δ,m/4)-core outcome for any δ > 0.
Consider a complete bipartite graph G(L,R,E), where |L| = |R| = m/2. The vertices are the
elements of the ground set W , and the constraints ensure that feasible outcomes are independent
sets. There are two agents. Agent 1 has unit utility for each vertex in L, and zero utility for each
vertex in R, while agent 2 has unit utility for each vertex in R. A feasible outcome is forced to
choose either vertices from L or vertices from R, and hence gives zero utility to at least one agent.
But this agent can deviate and choose an outcome with utility m/2, which is then scaled down to
m/4. Hence, no feasible outcome is (δ,m/4)-core for any δ > 0.
Note that in this example, the welfare-maximizing outcome for a single agent is simple to
compute, which shows that the non-existence of a good approximation to the core is orthogonal to
the computational difficulty of the single-agent welfare maximization problem.
Example 3. Recall that in the Knapsack setting, we are given a set of elements of different sizes,
and our goal is to select a subset of elements with total size at most a given budget B. We show that
for any ℓ > 0, there exists a Knapsack instance in which maximizing the smooth Nash welfare
objective F (c) =
∑
i∈N ln (ℓ+ ui(c)) returns an outcome that is not a (O(m
1/2−ǫ), O(m3/4−ǫ))-
core outcome. This is in contrast to Theorem 5, which provides a (δ, α)-core guarantee where δ is
constant and α is logarithmic in the number of elements.
Fix ℓ > 0. Set a large budget B ≥ ℓ4. There are m = B1/4 + B elements, of which B1/4
are large elements of size B3/4 and the remaining B are small elements of unit size. There are
n ≥ 4B1/4 log(2B) agents. Each agent has unit utility for each large element. A subset of αn
agents are special (we determine α later). These special agents have unit utility for each small
element, while the remaining agents have zero utility for the small elements.
The idea is to show that when α is sufficiently small, the smooth Nash welfare objective will
choose only the large elements. However, α can still be large enough so that the special agents can
deviate, and get a large amount of utility.
Note that maximizing the smooth Nash welfare objective returns a Pareto efficient solution,
and hence can be one of two types: it either chooses all large elements (which gives utility B1/4
to each agent), or it chooses B1/4 − r large elements and rB3/4 small elements. For the former to
have a larger smooth Nash welfare objective value, we need that for each 1 ≤ r ≤ B1/4,
ln(B1/4 + ℓ) > α ln
(
rB3/4 + (B1/4 − r) + ℓ
)
+ (1− α) ln(B1/4 − r + ℓ).
This holds true if
ln
(
B1/4 + ℓ
B1/4 + ℓ− r
)
> α ln
(
rB3/4 + (B1/4 − r) + ℓ
)
.
Since 0 < ℓ ≤ B1/4, the above is true for each 1 ≤ r ≤ B1/4 if
ln
(
2B1/4
2B1/4 − 1
)
> α ln
(
B1/4B3/4 +B1/4
)
.
This is true when
ln
(
1 +
1
2B1/4
)
≥ α ln(2B).
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Since ln(1 + x) ≥ x/2 for x ∈ [0, 1], the above holds when:
α ≤
1
4B1/4 ln(2B)
.
Let us set α = 1
4B1/4 ln(2B)
. Choosing all large elements maximizes the smooth Nash welfare
objective. Since n ≥ 1/α, there is at least one special agent. The special agents get utility B1/4
each. If they deviate and choose all the small elements, they get (scaled down) utility
αB =
B
4B1/4 ln(2B)
=
B3/4
4 ln(2B)
.
Hence, for the solution to be a (δ, α)-core outcome, we need (1+δ) ·B1/4+α ≥ B3/4/(4 ln(2B)).
Since m = Θ(B), this shows that the outcome is not a (O(m1/2−ǫ), O(m3/4−ǫ))-core outcome for
any constant ǫ > 0, as required.
B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4
The fractional outcome maximizing the Nash welfare objective is the solution of the following
program. For simplicity of presentation, we absorb the constraint that wj ≤ 1 for each j ∈W into
the packing constraints.
Maximize
∑
i∈N
lnUi (17)
∑m
j=1 akjwj ≤ bk ∀k ∈ [K]
Ui =
∑m
j=1wjuij ∀i ∈ N
wj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈W
Denote a vector of utilities by U = 〈U1, U2, . . . , Un〉, and the polytope of feasible utility vectors
by U . Then, the fractional MNW outcome is obtained by the following maximization.
max
U∈U
∑
i∈N
lnUi (18)
We want to compute a fractional (δ, ǫ)-approximate core outcome in time polynomial in n, Vmax,
and log 1δǫ . Assume that U is a convex polytope of feasible utility vectors. For any δ ≥ 0, ǫ > 0, let
ǫ′ = ǫ/(1 + δ). Define the following objective function. Note that in the absence of the ǫ′ term, it
would mimic the derivative of the Nash social welfare objective from Program (18).
min
U∈U
Q(U), where Q(U) = max
U′∈U
∑
i∈N
U ′i + ǫ
′
Ui + ǫ′
. (19)
Clearly, Q(U) ≥ n for every U. Thus, the objective value in Program (19) is at least
n. In Section 2.2, we presented an argument showing that the fractional MNW outcome is
in the core. A similar argument using the first order optimality condition shows that if U∗ ∈
argmaxU∈U
∑
i∈N ln(Ui + ǫ
′), then ∑
i∈N
Ui + ǫ
′
U∗i + ǫ
′
≤ n.
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This implies the optimum of Program (19) is achieved at the fractional outcome maximizing the
smooth Nash welfare objective
∑
i∈N ln(Ui + ǫ
′), and this optimal value is exactly n.
Next, we turn to efficiently approximating Program (19), and show that if Q(U) ≤ n(1 + δ),
then U is a (δ, ǫ)-core outcome.
We want to use the Ellipsoid algorithm to approximately minimize the objective function Q(U)
over U ∈ U in polynomial time. For this, all we need is that Q is a convex function, its subgradient
is efficiently computable, the range of Q and the diameter of U are exponentially bounded, and
polytope U is efficiently separable [7].
First, we claim that Q(U) is a convex function of U. To see this, note that for any fixed U′,
U ′i/Ui is convex in Ui. Since the sum and maximum of convex functions is convex, we conclude
that Q(U) is also convex.
Second, the subgradient of Q(U) is efficiently computable for every U ∈ U . First, we find the
U′ ∈ U that maximizes
∑
i∈N
U ′i+ǫ
′
Ui+ǫ′
by solving a linear program. Then, we fix U′ and take the
gradient of
U ′i
Ui
with respect to Ui to obtain a subgradient of Q(U).
Third, note that Ui ∈ [0, Vmax] for each i. Hence, Q(U) ≤
n·(Vmax+ǫ′)
ǫ′ , which is exponentially
bounded in the input size. It is easy to see that the same holds for the diameter of the polytop U .
Finally, polytope U is efficiently separable because it is a set of polynomially many linear
inequalities.
Hence, we can efficiently obtain a solution Uˆ ∈ U that satisfies
max
U′∈U
∑
i∈N
U ′i + ǫ
′
Uˆi + ǫ′
≤ n+ δ ≤ n(1 + δ).
Finally, we show that Uˆ must be a (δ, ǫ)-core outcome. Suppose for contradiction that it is not.
Then, there exists a subset S of agents and an outcome U′ such that
(1 + δ) · Uˆi + ǫ ≤
|S|
n
· U ′i
for all i ∈ S, and at least one inequality is strict. Rearranging the terms and summing over i ∈ S,
we obtain ∑
i∈S
U ′i
(1 + δ) · Uˆi + ǫ
> |S| ·
n
|S|
= n.
However, we also have∑
i∈S
U ′i
(1 + δ) · Uˆi + ǫ
≤
∑
i∈S
U ′i + ǫ
′
(1 + δ) · (Uˆi + ǫ′)
=
1
1 + δ
∑
i∈S
U ′i + ǫ
′
Uˆi + ǫ′
≤ n,
where the last inequality is due to approximate optimality of Uˆ. This is a contradiction. Hence,
Uˆ is a (δ, ǫ)-core outcome.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 7
We first state the standard theorem for Chernoff bounds.
Theorem 8. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xq be independent random variables in [0, 1], and let X =
∑q
j=1Xj .
For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we have:
Pr [X < (1− ǫ)E[X]] ≤ e−
ǫ2
2
E[X]
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Equivalently, for any η < E[X],
Pr [X < E[X]− η] ≤ e
− η
2
2E[X]
Lemma 7 follows from considering two cases. First, suppose (1− γ)A ≥ B.
Pr[X < (1− γ)2A] ≤ Pr[X < (1− γ)E[X]] ≤ e−
γ2
2
E[X]
≤ e−
γ2
2
max(γB,(1−γ)A) ≤ e−
γ3
2
max(B,A)
In the other case, if (1− γ)A < B, then γB ≤ E[X] ≤ (1 + γ)B. Then
Pr[X < (1− γ)A] ≤ Pr[X ≤ E[X]− γB]
≤ e
−γ2 B
2
2E[X] ≤ e
−γ2 B
2
2(1+γ)B
≤ e−
γ3
2
B ≤ e−
γ3
2
(1−γ)A ≤ e−
γ3
4
A
C Endowments-Based Core
In this section, we show that our randomized rounding approach to packing problems extends
to a slightly different definition of the core, and yields a similar approximation result.
This alternate definition of the core only applies to packing constraints. For simplicity of
presentation, we focus on the Approval Voting setting, where n agents have binary additive
utilities over m unit-size elements, and feasible outcomes are subsets of elements of size at most
B. So far, we considered a notion of core in which a subset S of agents can deviate and choose a
feasible outcome using the entire budget B; however, their utility is scaled down by |S|/n.
A different notion of core is based on scaling the endowment. Under this notion, when S deviates,
it can choose an outcome with a scaled down budget of B · |S|/n, but then its utility is not scaled
down. This notion of core has been considered in the context of participatory budgeting [11]
and logically implies proportional representation of voters in multi-winner elections with approval
voting. This notion builds on the seminal work of [13] on Lindahl equilibrium and its connection
to the core.
For P ≤ B, let O(P ) denote the set of outcomes consisting of at most P elements.
Definition 6. We say that an outcome c is a (δ, α)-core outcome if for every subset S of agents
and every outcome c′ ∈ O(B · (1 − δ) · |S|n ), it is not the case that ui(c
′) ≥ (1 + δ) · ui(c) + α for
all i ∈ S and at least one inequality is strict. We refer to a (0, 0)-core outcome simply as a core
outcome.
As shown by [11], it follows directly from the work of [13] that there always exists a fractional
core outcome in this setting due to a fixed point argument.2 However, it is not known if a fractional
core or approximate core outcome can be computed in polynomial time.
More interestingly, it is also an open question whether an integral core outcome always exists
for Approval Voting. It is easy to show that an integral core outcome does not always exist in a
slightly more general setting of participatory budgeting, in which non-binary utilities and different
sized elements are allowed. Consider an example with three elements {a, b, c} of size 2 each, a
budget of B = 3, and three agents with cyclic preferences over the elements as follows.
2Note that Theorem 4 does not apply in this setting, since it requires scaling the utility by the size of the coalition.
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a b c
u1 1 0.5 0
u2 0 1 0.5
u3 0.5 0 1
An integral outcome c can only choose a single element. Without loss of generality, suppose
c = {a}. Then, the set of agents S = {2, 3} and outcome c′ = {c} show a violation of the core.
We now show the existence of an approximate core solution. We begin with the fractional
core outcome x that can be computed using fixed point methods [13, 11]. We use dependent
rounding [14] to round x to X so that (i) xj = E[Xj ] for each element j; (ii) the constraint∑
j Xj ≤ B is preserved; and (iii) {Xj} are negatively correlated. Since we do not know if the
fractional core outcome can be computed in polynomial time, this algorithm is not necessarily
polynomial time, but it yields the following approximation result.
Theorem 9. For δ ∈ (0, 1], there is a (δ, α)-core for Approval Voting, where α = O
(
1
δ4 log
B
δ
)
.
Proof. We only sketch the proof of the upper bound, since it is similar to the argument in Sec-
tion 5.4.2. Let γ = δ5 . Let U
∗
i denote the utility agent i receives in the fractional core outcome. We
have U∗i ∈ [0, B]. Let Uˆi be the random variable denoting the utility agent i obtains in the rounded
allocation.
Let L = 2
γ4
log 4Bγ . First, if U
∗
i ≤ L, then Uˆi ≥ U
∗
i − L trivially. Otherwise, U
∗
i ≥ L, and using
Lemma 7, we have:
Pr
[
Uˆi < (1− 2γ)U
∗
i
]
≤ e−
γ3
4
U∗i ≤ e−
γ3
4
L ≤
1
2B
.
Let F denote the subset of agents with Uˆi < min ((1− 2γ)U
∗
i , U
∗
i − L). By Markov’s inequality:
Pr
[
|F | ≥
n
B
]
≤
1
2
.
Let W = N \ F . Suppose set S of agents deviate. We consider two cases:
Case 1. Suppose |W ∩ S| ≥ (1 − γ)|S|. Then, consider the agents in W ∩ S, P = |W∩S|n B ≥
(1 − γ) |S|n B ≥ (1 − δ)
|S|
n B and any allocation h ∈ O(P ). By the core condition, there exists
i ∈W ∩ S with U∗i ≥ Ui(h). Since i ∈W , we have
Uˆi ≥ min ((1− 2γ)U
∗
i , U
∗
i − L) .
This implies Ui(h) ≤ Uˆi(1 + 5γ) + L.
Case 2. Otherwise, |S \W | ≥ γ|S|. Then
|S| ≤
1
γ
|S ∩ F | ≤
1
γ
|F | ≤
1
γ
n
B
.
Thus, if S deviates, their scaled down budget is at most 1/γ. Using this budget, an agent in S
can derive utility at most 1/γ < α. Since we give α utility for free to each agent in S under our
additive approximation, the approximate core condition is satisfied.
The above proof generalizes to arbitrary packing constraints Ax ≤ b. In this case, let ∆ =
maxkmaxj
bi
akj
. For P ≤ 1, let O(P ) denote the set of outcomes satisfying Ax ≤ Pb.
Then, for δ ≥ 0 and α ≥ 0, we say that an outcome c is a (δ, α)-core outcome if for any S ⊆ N
and outcome c′ ∈ O( t(1−δ)n ), it is not the case that ui(c
′) ≥ (1 + δ) · ui(c) + α and at least one
inequality is strict. Generalizing the above proof, it is easy to show the following theorem.
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Theorem 10. For δ ∈ (0, 1], there is a (δ, α)-core outcome for general packing problems, where
α = O
(
1
δ4
log ∆δ
)
.
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